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Constitutionalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Will Lightning Strike Thrice?
Robert A. Burt*
The necessary conjunction of caution with wisdom has been
the very definition of judicial conduct in American law. The common law methodology, deferring to precedent and deciding only
what is necessary to resolve the specific dispute at hand, exemplifies this conjunction. Constitutional adjudication has traditionally followed this course.
Courts do, of course, overrule precedent and sometimes
announce spacious principles intended to have general applicability. Brown v. Board of Education1 is the preeminent example
of the wisdom of this course in constitutional adjudication.
Brown also exemplifies the conjunction of caution with wisdom.
Of the nine Justices in 1954 who unanimously proclaimed that
"separate is inherently unequal," notwithstanding the authority
of Plessy v. Ferguson,2 five had served on the Court together
since 1941.1 During these thirteen years, the Justices addressed
the constitutional validity of racial segregation laws in many different contexts, including graduate school public education,4 voting practices, 5 public transportation, and judicial enforcement of
restrictive housing covenants.7 Brown was the climax of a cautiously incremental judicial course and, even then, Brown's bold-

*

Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University.

1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. Justice Hugo Black was appointed to the Court by Franklin Roosevelt in 1937,
followed by Stanley Reed in 1938, Felix Frankfurter and William Douglas in 1939 and
Robert Jackson in 1941.
4. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S, 637
(1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Florida, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
5. Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
6. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.
373 (1946).
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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ness was significantly tempered by the cautious incrementalism
that the Court adopted in Brown 11.8
This judicial caution has costs, as many critics have observed.9
In its prolonged struggle against racially discriminatory practices in the decades following Brown, the Court displayed
increasing impatience. In 1968, the Court finally repudiated the
incremental enforcement directive of Brown I1.10 Perhaps chastened by the gap between its enunciation of constitutional principle and the resistant state practices, the Court became visibly
bolder in attacking state racially discriminatory practices after
1968 and its boldness was immediately extended to other state
practices.
Decisions concerning abortion and the death penalty were the
most notable and publicly visible examples of a more abrupt style
of judicial intervention. In 1973, Roe v. Wade effectively overturned abortion restrictions then in force in all but four states. "
Unlike the carefully measured progression of judicial decisions
that preceded Brown, the Supreme Court had previously adjudicated only one case involving abortion restrictions. The previous
decision had given virtually no hint of doubt concerning the constitutional status of restrictive abortion laws.' 2 Similarly, in
1972, the Court abruptly and unexpectedly invalidated the death
penalty statutes then extant in forty-one states. Before its decision in Furman v. Georgia,'13 the Court had found constitutional
problems only in jury selection practices, a narrow though important aspect of the administration of state death penalties. 4 The
sweeping condemnation in Furman appeared suddenly, like a
stroke of lightning, the metaphor that Justice Stewart invoked to
describe the capricious unpredictability that he found constitutionally offensive in the administration of the death penalty generally.' 5 And like lightning, Furman disappeared almost as
quickly as it had arrived. Just four years later, after thirty-five
states had quickly enacted new death penalty laws, the Court
8. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (declining to mandate immediate enforcement of the apparently sweeping principle that the Court had announced the
preceding year).
9. See Robert A. Burt, Brown's Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483-84 & nn.3-4 (1994).
10. "[A] school board today [must] come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Green v. New Kent County School
Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
11. 410 U.S. 113, 139-40 & n.37 (1973).
12. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (upholding abortion restriction
against constitutional vagueness claim).
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
15. 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Roe and Furman, viewed as examples of the reaction to the
measured pace of and adamant resistance to Brown, may denote
that the traditionally accepted judicial virtue of caution joined
with wisdom no longer has self-evident normative force in constitutional adjudication. 17 If judges are more tempted today, however, to enunciate sweeping principles, the recent rulings of the
Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals on physicianassisted suicide18 go a considerable distance beyond even Roe
and Furman in their abruptness, their lightning-like appearance
from nowhere.
I.

FINDING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE

Although Roe was an unexpected invocation of judicial authority on behalf of freely-chosen abortions, state legislatures had
been moving toward this result for more than a decade. In 1959,
the American Law Institute had proposed substantial liberalization of the grounds for abortion in its Model Penal Code, most
notably permitting abortion to protect the pregnant woman's
future "mental health."' 9 This liberalization had been adopted
by "about one third of the states" when Roe was decided.2"
Although these statutes still required physician boards to
approve a woman's request for abortion, retrospective studies in
California show that in practice, these liberalized standards
amounted to abortion on demand. It is likely that this same
practical impact occurred in other liberalizing states. 2 1 More sig16.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See generally

ROBERT

A. BURT, THE

CONsTrruTIoN IN CoNFuaCr 335-38 (1992).

17. For speculation about generational differences in the understanding of constitutional adjudication from Brown to Roe and Furman, see Robert A. Burt, Alex Bickel's
Law School and Ours, 104 YALE L.J. 1853 (1995).
18. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), en banc, cert
granted, Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110);
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted,Vacco v. Quill, 65 U.S.L.W. 3254
(U.S. Oct. 1, 1996)(No. 95-1858).
19.

KRisTiN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 69 (1984).

20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139 & n.37.
21. Luker, supra note 19, at 94. Luker stated:
In 1968, the first full year under the new [liberalized California] law, 5,018 abortions were performed. In the next year, however, the number of abortions tripled,
to 15,952. The following year that number itself quadrupled, and 65,369 abortions
were performed. In 1971 it almost doubled again, and 116,749 abortions were performed. In 1972 the rate stabilized at a little over 100,000 abortions and has
remained at that level to the present. In four short years, therefore, the number of
abortions sought and performed in California increased by 2,000 percent. More-

over, by 1970, it was becoming apparent that what had been proposed as a "middleway" solution had in fact become "abortion on demand." It is possible that the
mechanisms of medical review (and psychiatric review in the case of those using
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nificantly, in 1971, New York, Washington, Alaska and Hawaii
repealed all restrictions on first-trimester abortions. Thus, when
the Supreme Court decided Roe, four state legislatures had
already explicitly approved freely-chosen abortions, and, in some
fifteen additional states, this legal regime was already available
in practice.
Judicial abolition of the death penalty in Furman had been
more extensively anticipated by state legislatures. By 1972, the
death penalty had been completely abolished in nine states, as
early as 1853 in Wisconsin and 1846 in Michigan.22 Moreover, by
1972, four additional states had so narrowly limited the application of their death penalties as to amount to virtual abolition.'
Accordingly, although both Roe and Furman were unexpected
exercises of judicial authority and imposed a rule on every state
which had been in effect in only a minority of states, the actual
impact of both cases was not unprecedented. Many states had
already accumulated considerable experience in the practical
administration and the cultural implications of the legal regimes
made generally applicable in Roe and Furman. Large, controversial questions remained about the legitimacy of the Court's
rulings in both cases and the moral acceptability of the judiciallycommanded results. Nonetheless, the likely consequences of
freely-available abortions and an abolished death penalty were
predictable because of the prior state experience.
No one knows what to expect, however, regarding legally recognized physician-assisted suicide, since there is no directly relevant past experience. No state now recognizes, nor has ever
recognized, the legitimacy of physician-assisted suicide. In 1992,
Oregon voters approved by referendum a measure that would,
for the first time in any American jurisdiction, authorize physicians to prescribe (but not administer) lethal medication for voluntary, mentally competent, terminally ill people. This measure
the "mental health" criterion) may have been sufficiently cumbersome and expensive to discourage some women from applying for an abortion in the first place; but
by late 1970, of all women who applied for an abortion, 99.2 percent were granted
one. By 1971 abortion was as frequent as it would ever become in California [even
after the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade], and one out of every three pregnancies
was ended by a legal abortion ....
By 1971, women in California had abortions
because they wanted them, not because physicians agreed that they could have
them.
22. The abolitionist states were, in addition to Wisconsin and Michigan, Maine
(1887), Minnesota (1911), North Dakota (1915), Alaska (1957), Hawaii (1957), Oregon
(1964), and Iowa (1965). See FRAiua E. ZIARING & GORDON HAwINs, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT AND THE A MRICAN AGENDA 29, 31 (1986). Michigan retained the death penalty as a

punishment for treason until 1963. Id.
23. These states were West Virginia (1965), Vermont (1965), New York (1966) and
New Mexico (1969). See id. at 31.
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has not yet gone into effect. A federal district court held it unconstitutional 24 and, though the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
explicitly disapproved this ruling in its opinion overturning the
Washington state ban on physician-assisted suicide,25 the Oregon law remains stalled. Although it seems likely that the constitutional challenge to the Oregon law will ultimately be
dismissed,2 6 the rulings by the Second and Ninth Circuit overturning state laws explicitly forbidding physician-assisted suicide were not merely novel exercises of constitutional authority.
These rulings startlingly impose a legal result that was without
precedent in any prior state or federal legislative action.
This fact has several implications. First, it raises questions
concerning the sources of principle on which judges have relied in
interpreting constitutional commands. This is a complex issue.
In our constitutional tradition, judges are meant to protect
minorities against majoritarian overreaching. Thus, simply
observing that a judge has constitutionally invalidated a law
approved by majorities in all but one state does not in itself
demonstrate that the judge has erred. Nonetheless, life-tenured
judges have customarily worried, and should always worry,
about succumbing to the temptation of confusing their personal
moral views with constitutional norms. As Justice Brandeis
classically observed, "in the exercise of this high power [of constitutional invalidation], we must be ever on our guard, lest we
erect our prejudices into legal principles."27 If the Supreme
Court unanimously affirms the judgments of the Ninth and Second Circuits, this would mean that a total of twenty-one people
(nine on the Supreme Court, eight on the Ninth Circuit en banc
24. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F.Supp. 1429 (D.Or. 1995).
25. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 839 & nn.138-39.
26. The district court had invalidated the Oregon statute on the ground that it
violated equal protection guarantees by providing insufficient safeguards to assure that
its application would be limited to those who were truly voluntary and mentally competent. It is, however, difficult to understand the jurisprudential theory by which these
possible insufficiencies become transformed into constitutional infirmities. The district
court maintained that, because the Oregon statute authorized assisted suicide only for
terminally ill people, the non-terminally ill were given more effective protections and this
distinction was constitutionally irrational. While it may not be good public policy, however, it does not seem wholly irrational to permit people who are diagnosed as terminally
ill and mentally competent to obtain lethal medication which they must self-administer,
thus providing an added measure of assurance for voluntariness. One might argue that
there is a "fundamental right" against involuntary euthanasia that is so powerful that no
imaginable legislative safeguards could ever be sufficient to assure voluntariness. That
appears to be the underlying argument of the district court in Lee v. Oregon, supra note
24, but the district court did not explicitly make this argument and it is difficult to identify constitutional law precedent for doing so.
27. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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panel plus one dissenting judge on the original panel, two on the
Second Circuit panel, and the District Judge in the Ninth Circuit
case) will have imposed on every state a legal conclusion that had
been endorsed by the voters of only one state in the Union.
Judges have properly invalidated widely-enacted laws to vindicate constitutional values. Yet, notwithstanding the judicial
boldness expressed in such decisions as Brown, Roe, Furman,
Lochner v. New York,' or even Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 9 there is
no judicial decision in our entire tradition that has constitutionally imposed a result on all states which had been previously
approved in only one. The constitutional invalidations by the
Ninth and Second Circuits of state laws prohibiting physicianassisted suicide are, in this sense, utterly unprecedented.
Many individuals have criticized these rulings for employing
prior precedents in substantive constitutional law, asking
whether the "privacy" or "liberty" interest proclaimed in Roe can
logically be extended to physician-assisted suicide, as the Ninth
Circuit held, or whether equal protection rationality standards
prohibit state law distinctions between deaths resulting from
refusing as opposed to demanding medical treatment, as the Second Circuit held. This author's concern is not with the courts'
substantive interpretations themselves; indeed, this author
believes it was a larger substantive leap from Griswold30 to Roe,
from the privacy right for two consenting adults to use contraception to the claim that abortion is a "private choice," notwithstanding the plausibility of state claims to protect fetal life, than
from Roe to the Ninth Circuit's ruling regarding physicianassisted suicide. This author's concern is with the abruptness of
the judicial process by which that substantive interpretation
occurred. It is in this sense that the physician-assisted suicide
rulings are without precedent.
II.

TRANSLATING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE INTO PRACTICE

Even if a federal court could justifiably find the existence of a
constitutional principle requiring the legal authorization of physician-assisted suicide, the absence of any state experience in
this matter means that no one knows how, or even whether, the
constitutional principle could be effectively vindicated in
practice.
Both the Ninth and Second Circuits held that physician assistance must be limited to terminally ill people who voluntarily
28.
29.
30.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60 U.S. 393 (1857),
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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choose suicide and are mentally competent to do so. 3 ' The centrality of voluntariness and mental competence in these rulings
arises from the internal logic of the constitutional principle that
the Ninth Circuit most explicitly invoked as the basis for its ruling: the principle of individual liberty "involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy."3 2 The Second
Circuit held that the New York law irrationally distinguished
between authorizing physicians to withhold life-saving medical
treatment and forbidding them actively to assist in hastening
death;33 but this is not a coherent invocation of equal protection
analysis unless there is some special reason for heightened scrutiny of the state legislative distinctions, such as the "liberty
interest" on which the Ninth Circuit relied.
There are, however, peculiar difficulties in assuring both the
voluntariness and mental competence of gravely ill people who
might choose hastened death, difficulties that are more troubling
and intractable than choice-making in most other contexts,
including such emotionally charged matters as abortion. Unless
these difficulties can be overcome in actual practice, it is a hollow
pretense to proclaim respect for an individual's right to choose
hastened death.3 4

31. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793; Quill, 80 F.3d at 718.
32. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
33. Quill, 80 F.3d at 727.
34. These difficulties also afflict an individual faced with a decision to decline lifeprolonging treatment offered by the individual's physician, a decision which the Supreme
Court has already implied rests within a constitutionally protected "liberty interest."
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990). The context of an
individual's decision to refuse life-prolonging treatment, in itself, provides significant
checks for voluntariness, if not mental competence, that are lacking for a decision in favor
of physician-assisted suicide. In the former context, a physician's offer to provide lifeprolonging treatment presents a counterweight to the patient's apparently contrary inclinations; whereas, when physicians offer to assist suicide, which, by the Ninth Circuit's
hypothesis, physicians must remain free to do, this counterweight is not only removed,
but the individual patient's choice for suicide is likely to be implicitly validated and
facilitated.
Even if the psychological pressures accompanying decisions to decline treatment
are the same, however, as the pressures experienced in decisions to enlist physician
assistance for suicide, this is a reason for judicial caution in pressing forward with proclamations of constitutional rights to decline treatment. This caution was reflected in the
Supreme Court's tentative approach in Cruzan, where the Court refused to impose a uniform constitutional rule on all states but deferred to their diverse "sources available" in
resolving "a perplexing question with unusually strong moral and ethical overtones."
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
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Voluntariness

1. Pain
The most powerful and poignant argument on behalf of legalizing physician-assisted suicide is to provide release for terminally
ill people from intense, intractable pain.35 For anyone forced to
choose between continued life with such pain and the release of
death, the pain obviously exerts an enormous and even overwhelming coercive impact. Obviously, this impact alone cannot
justify characterizing a choice for death as "involuntary." If,
however, this pain is actually avoidable but the suffering individual is neither informed of this fact nor given the opportunity to
alleviate this terrible pain, then this individual is not acting voluntarily in choosing death as the only or even the preferred way
to end suffering.
Many dying people in this country today are suffering from
insufficiently treated pain. 6 Medically effective techniques for
completely alleviating this pain are available for almost all
of these people. According to knowledgable physicians and
researchers, this is possible in as many as 98% of cancer cases. 7
The medical profession generally, however, is neither informing
patients of this possibility nor providing this palliative care.38
35. Both the Second and Ninth Circuits repeatedly relied on this proposition to
justify their rulings. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 820, 825, 827, 834 ("debilitating

pain and humiliating death... unusual and protracted suffering... slow and agonizing
death ... unmitigated tortures"); Quill, 80 F.3d at 719, 730 ("chronic, intractable pain
and/or intolerable suffering"... "continuation of agony").
36.

American Medical Ass'n Council on Scientific Affairs, Good Care of the Dying

Patient, 275 JAMA 474, 475 (1996). The council stated:
How commonly pain marks the actual experience of dying is uncertain, and estimates vary substantially across institutions, whether hospices or hospitals. Coyle
et al reported that three of every four cancer patients had pain. Bonica's review of
published reports indicates that more half of cancer patients have severe pain.
Saunders has claimed that one fourth of cancer patients have inadequate pain control when dying.
Id. (citations omitted). See also C. S. Cleeland et al., Pain and its Treatment in Outpatients with Metastic Cancer, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592 (1994).
37. American Med. Ass'n, 275 JAMA at 475 (citations omitted). The Council further stated:
Only 2% of patients in hospice care experience pain that is difficult for a skilled
team to manage. With the exception of one study, other investigators confirm this
low rate of serious pain persisting in systems of care that emphasize pain management. The rates of pain in persons who are dying of diseases other than cancer are
not [however] well described.
Id.
38. Id.
The potential for management of pain has recently improved, both through the
development of better techniques and through enhanced care delivery through hospice and palliative care efforts.... Although guidelines and a curriculum on pain
management have been developed, oncologists and others report serious perceived
shortcomings in management of cancer pain.
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The reasons for this failure by the medical profession are not
adequately understood, nor is an effective remedy for this failure
known. There are many possible explanations, such as: insufficient knowledge among physicians about pain management
because of inadequate professional training; state and federal
legal restrictions on availability of controlled substances for pain
relief and/or physician misconceptions about the legal restrictions; failure to acknowledge a patient's pain because of unwillingness or inability of physicians and other medical personnel to
engage in more than perfunctory conversation, or, in many cases,
any conversation with patients who are perceived as dying.3 9
The explanation for this failure cannot plausibly be cruelty or
callousness of the medical profession. There is widespread
acknowledgment and dismay within the profession about the
failure to provide even minimally adequate pain palliation for
most dying people. Not enough is known about the causes of this
failure, however, to confidently prescribe effective remedies for it.
The most recent and disturbing indication of the profession's
ignorance are the research results of the so-called SUPPORT
project (Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments). This four-year study, involving
over nine thousand dying adult patients in five United States
teaching hospitals, was designed "to improve end-of-life decision
making and reduce the frequency of a mechanically supported,
painful, and prolonged process of dying."' Phase I of the study,
establishing the empirical base-line of practices current in 198991, documented that, overall, "50% of all conscious ... patients
who died in the hospital experienced moderate or severe pain at
least half the time during their last 3 days of life," although there
was "substantial variation" among the five hospitals.4 ' In Phase
Other distressing symptoms of dying patients, in addition to pain, are also inadequately treated by physicians. See Susan Block & Andrew Billings, Patient Requests to
Hasten Death: Evaluation and Management in Terminal Care" 154 ARCH.INTERN.MED.
2039, 2040 (1994) ("Other symptoms [beyond pain] (eg., dyspnea, anorexia, nausea, constipation, insomnia, and anxiety) regularly plague terminally ill patients and are often
inadequately controlled by physicians who lack expertise in palliative care or fail to take
an aggressive stance toward assuring patient comfort").
39. See Kathleen Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to
Patient Requests for Physician-AssistedSuicide, 6 J.PAIN & SYMPTOM MGmT 289, 290-93
(1991); M. B. Max, Improving Outcomes of Analgesic Treatment: Is EducationEnough?,
113 ANN. INT. MED. 885 (1990); J. H. Von Rouenn et al, PhysicianAttitudes and Practice
in Cancer Pain Management, 119 ANN. INT. MED. 121 (1993).
40. Alfred F. Connors et al, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill
HospitalizedPatients: the Study to UnderstandPrognoses and Preferences for Outcomes
and Risks of Treatment (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
41. Id. at 1594. This base-line result was consistent with numerous other prior
research reports. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF A WORLD HEALTH ORG. EXPERT
COMMrrrEE: CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND PALLIATIVE CARE 19 (1990).
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II, conducted in 1992-94, patients were divided into intervention
and control groups, with the intervention group receiving intensive services from a "specially trained nurse" who, among other
functions, facilitated communication and "encouraged attention
to pain control" between the medical care team and the patients
and their families.42 Unfortunately, this "phase II intervention
failed to improve care or patient outcomes." In particular,
reports of untreated pain during the last three days of life actually somewhat increased among intervention group patients in
comparison to control group patients."
The SUPPORT study was the most comprehensive research on
the experience of dying patients ever conducted in this country.
The failure of its intervention, not simply to correct, but to measurably affect the problem of unnecessary but untreated pain
among dying patients, is a puzzling result. 44 Much more extensive changes in physician education and institutional structural
arrangements may be necessary in order to make generally
available the existing well-documented techniques of pain relief
that, when actually implemented, are effective for almost all
dying patients. Alternatively, perhaps relatively modest
changes, untested by the SUPPORT researchers, including
amendments to restrictive state drug control laws recently proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and currently being considered in many states,45 may
have a substantial impact.
As long as substantial numbers of dying people are unnecessarily suffering from treatable pain, however, no one can claim that
an individual's choice to end his or her life rather than endure
pain is an adequately voluntary act. States cannot design adequate safeguards to assure that every suffering person has access
to available pain control treatment when the reasons why such
42. Connors, supra note 40, at 1591.
43. Id. at 1595.
44. As the researchers observed,
The study certainly casts a pall over any claim that, if the health care system is
given additional resources for collaborative decision making in the form of skilled
professional time, improvements will occur ....
[T]he overall results of this study
are not encouraging. No pattern emerged that implied that the intervention was
successful for some set of patients or physicians or that its impact increased over

time. The five hospitals had been chosen for their diversity and their willingness to
undertake a substantial and controversial challenge. Yet none showed a tendency
toward improvement in these outcomes.
Id. at 1596. See generally, Dying Well in the Hospital: The Lessons of SUPPORT, 25
HASTINGS CENTER REPoRT, Special Supplement S1-$36 (1995).
45. See David Joranson, A New Drug Law for the States: An Opportunity to Affirm
the Role of Opioids in Cancer Pain Relief, 5 J. PAW & SYMPTOM MGrr 333 (1990).
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treatment is not being provided to large numbers of patients is
not yet understood.
Moreover, recognition of a right to physician-assisted suicide is
likely to create barriers to the provision of effective pain control
and other symptomatic relief to dying patients. This paradoxical
result could arise because some pharmacologic measures that are
medically necessary to relieve intense pain or other symptoms
can also have the unintended effect of hastening death. Even
though such measures violate neither legal nor ethical proscriptions, some physicians are currently reluctant to administer adequate palliative medications because of their potential lifeshortening effect. 46 If physician-assisted suicide were legalized
and accompanied by stringent procedural safeguards, many
more physicians might conclude that even their current practices
of pain control might require observance of these stringent new
procedures. The net result would be the imposition of new barriers to the provision of currently recognized palliative care measures, thus increasing the already large number of patients who
suffer needlessly from inadequate pain control. This paradoxical
result would not inevitably follow from legalized physicianassisted suicide but it seems likely to do so and, in any event,
carefully designed implementation measures would be required
to guard against this possibility. In common, however, with all of
the current barriers to adequate medical provision of palliative
measures, we do not yet know enough about the underlying reasons for these barriers in order to design effective remedies to
overcome them.
2.

Undue FinancialPressures

Prolonged dying from chronic illness, which is the increasingly
common mode of death in this country, can be extremely expensive for patients and their families, and for private and public
health insurers. 47 The Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized that
the "risk of undue influence is real - and it exists today," and that
patients would choose suicide based on their own or others' concerns about "astronomical medical bills." Though Judge Reinhardt, in his opinion for the court, specifically mentioned the
prospect of "undue pressure from callous, financially burdened,
or self-interested relatives," he minimized this concern as a significant factor in pressures for physician-assisted suicide on the
46. See WoRLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 41, at 52-53.
47. See generally K E. Covinsky et al., The Impact of Serious Illness on Patients'
Families, 272 JAMA 1839 (1994); Anne Scitovsky, 'The High Cost of Dying'Revisited, 72
MmBANK Q. 561 (1994).
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ground "that the person will die shortly in any event."" Thus,
Judge Reinhardt reasoned that grasping relatives will have little
to gain in pressing for hasty decisions and, moreover, that direct
involvement of a "professional third party in the decision-making
process would more likely provide an important safeguard."4 9
Judge Reinhardt ignored the most potent new social force
whose financial self-interest would not be thus tempered. Institutional arrangements in the delivery of health care are now in
the midst of a fundamental transformation, as increasingly large
numbers of patients are choosing, or are being forced by their
employers or by state agencies to accept, the provision of medical
treatment through managed care organizations. "The most
troubling issue for end-of-life care in managed care is the possibility that clinicians are changed from being patients' advocates
to having a personal stake in withholding treatment that would
be in the patients' interests."5 °
Because the dominance of managed care organizations in
American health care is relatively recent, there has been little
systematic study of the extent of inappropriate cost-cutting pressures on patients. If physician-assisted suicide suddenly
becomes a constitutionally-sanctioned option for all patients,
however, it is certainly plausible and perhaps even likely that
budget-minded health care organization managers and their
physician-employees would press all of their dying patients
toward exercising this option. Judge Reinhardt's dismissive
observation that grasping heirs would have little financial incentive to pressure a soon-dead relative toward a quicker suicide has
no relevance to the motivations of managed care physicians who
would realize substantial financial gains if many of their soondead patients chose quicker deaths. Perhaps traditional patientcentered medical ethics would guard against this improper pressure; perhaps external regulation of the new health care organizations would adequately protect dying patients against undue
influence. Our experience of managed care, however, is too new
48. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826.
49. Id.
50. Steven Miles et al., End-of-Life Treatment in Managed Care: The Potential and
the Peril, 163 WESTERN J. MED. 302, 304 (1995). As Miles et al. observe:
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider plans, and managed indemnity insurance cover 80% of the privately insured persons in the United
States. Recent large-scale extensions of managed care to public programs of Medicare and Medicaid ensure the continued rapid growth of managed care. The raison
d'etre of managed care is to contain the growth of the cost of health care for groups
of enrollees ....
Managed care plans cannot afford to ignore the cost of end-of-life
care. About 10% of health care resources are used for the care of persons in their
last year of life.
Id. at 302.
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for any confident claims on this score. Yet, as Judge Reinhardt's
opinion for the Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized, without carefully designed safeguards to counteract "the risk of undue influence" for financial gain, a dying person's choice of physicianassisted suicide would not truly be a voluntary act.
Unjustified financial pressures would have an even more powerful effect on the large proportion of the American public without any health insurance, who number some forty million
according to recent estimates. 51 Once again Judge Reinhardt's
opinion noted the problem ("[w]e would be inclined to agree that
the country's refusal to provide universal health care, and the
concomitant suffering so many Americans are forced to undergo,
demonstrates a serious flaw in our national values."52), but none-

theless failed to acknowledge the central relevance of this problem to the constitutional legitimization of physician-assisted
suicide. Unless there can be adequate assurances that no person
chooses physician-assisted suicide because of poverty, this choice
cannot be considered sufficiently voluntary. The judiciary is,
however, not institutionally capable nor constitutionally authorized to create a system to guarantee health care regardless of
income. 3
If physician-assisted suicide is to be based on truly voluntary
choice, it must only be offered as one part of a general social
arrangement which ensures that no one is forced to choose suicide because he or she is too impoverished to obtain generally
available medical services. If there should be a right to physician-assisted suicide, in other words, it must be accompanied by
general social recognition of a right to adequate health care. The
judiciary acting alone cannot achieve this goal. Two years ago,
Congress intensely deliberated the establishment of a national
health insurance program and, for many complex reasons, failed
to act. The question is still being openly debated both in Congress and in individual state legislatures. The Ninth Circuit
opinion observed that "as members of the judicial branch.., we
are compelled to stand aside from that battle."5 ' The proper way
to "stand aside" is for courts to withhold any judgment regarding
51. See President Finds He Has Gained Even If He Lost on Health Care, N.Y.
Tms, July 30, 1996, p. Al, col. 5.
52. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826.
53. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973)(complex issues regarding equalization of school financing are not amenable to judicial resolution based on a constitutional claim for equal protection); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)(state welfare law computations of family financial need are not
amenable to judicial resolution based on equal protection claims).
54. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826.
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the existence of a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide while Congress and state legislatures are engaged in considering whether and how to implement a general right to health
care, actions that alone could adequately eliminate the "undue
influence" of poverty from any patient's deliberation about
whether his or her chosen treatment should be physicianassisted suicide.
B. Mental Competence
1.

Judgment-ImpairingConfusion

"Confusional states are common" among dying people and,
accordingly, "obtaining a truly informed consent is problematic."55 Regarding patients with advanced cancer, "the brain...
is subject to many insults, including multiple drug effects, metastatic involvement, sepsis, and a plethora of metabolic abnormalities."56 After these factors have been excluded, "for unknown
reasons a substantive number of cancer patients will remain
delirious."5 7
It may seem self-evident that such confusional states would be
readily detected by physicians or even by lay observers such as
family members and that requests for assisted suicide would be
appropriately disregarded. In actual practice, however, the
detection of judgment-impairing confusion among dying people is
surprisingly difficult.58 Based on several studies of dying
patients, one researcher concluded that "our clinical observations
miss profound confusional episodes in [20%] of our patients."59
Eduardo Bruera, a Canadian palliative care specialist with
extensive experience treating dying patients, described one of
these studies as follows:
55. Neil MacDonald, Suffering and Dying in CancerPatients:ResearchFrontiersin
ControllingConfusion, Cachexia, and Dyspnea, 163 WESTERN J. MED. 278, 280-81 (1995).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. J. Francis et al., A Prospective Study of Delirium in Hospitalized Elderly, 263
JAMA 1097, 1098, 1100 (1990).
Physicians frequently fail to recognize cognitive impairment in hospitalized
patients and may miss delirium because of its fluctuating features and subtle presentation. When physician diagnosis is required to identify cases of delirium,
reported rates have been quite low.... In this study of elderly patients on medical
services, delirium occurred in over one-fifth of subjects and was usually evident
within 48 hours of admission. Our prospective surveillance identified many more
patients with delirium than were seen by psychiatric consultants or diagnosed by
physicians.
Id.
59. Eduardo Bruera, Issues of Symptom Control in Patientswith Advanced Cancer,
Am. J. HOSPICE & PALuiATIvE CARE (March/April 1993) at 13.

1996

Constitutional Physician-Assisted Suicide

173

We looked at 45 patients that we had approached to participate in
clinical trials.... Of the 38 patients who signed the consent form we

later determined, based on the administration of a Mini-Mental Status Questionnaire that six (21 percent) had severe cognitive impairment. These findings are open to many interpretations. One that
raised a great deal of concern among us is that we believe that pallia-

tive care doctors and nurses spend more time talking to patients than
the average physician and nurse and [yet] in our conversations with
these patients we did not perceive them as being profoundly
impaired. 6°
Bruera studied an additional sixty-one patients, administering

the Mini-Mental Status Questionnaire three times each week
until the patient had been discharged or had died. Based on this
testing, he found that "thirty-four percent had cognitive failure
upon admission and [83%] had it before death," but when physicians and nurses not involved in this testing were asked for their
independent observational assessments, "an episode of confusion
identified by testing was not detected by the doctor on the same
day in [23%] of cases, and was missed by the nurse in [22%] of
cases." Attempting to explain these counter-intuitive results, the
researcher speculated, "[w]hat we may be observing among
patients is an effort on their part to compensate for their cognitive failure because nobody likes to be viewed as not knowing
61
where they are, what day it is or who they are talking to."

These results are consistent with more general observations in
the SUPPORT study about shortcomings in communications
between physicians and dying patients. The SUPPORT study
found in Phase I that, of the patients who had expressed preferences for withholding cardiopulmonary resuscitation, "only 47%
of their physicians accurately reported this preference."62 In
Phase II, for the intervention group in which a specially trained
nurse talked with both physicians and patients on a regular
basis regarding patient preferences, the SUPPORT study found
essentially no improvement in physicians' understanding of
patients' preferences.
It appears, then, that dying patients and their physicians are
generally reluctant to talk with one another about matters of
profound importance ("discussions and decisions substantially in
advance of death were uncommon"63 ), and that there are substantial misperceptions between physicians and patients when
conversations do occur. These profound silences and miscom60. Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 13.
62. Connors, supra note 40, at 1594.
63. Id. at 1595.
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munications between physicians and dying patients are often
mirrored in general doctor-patient interactions.64
This pattern of persistently missed communications appears to
confirm the finding that physicians and nurses regularly overstate dying patients' decision-making competence. The explanation for this is not clear. Perhaps it occurs because of medical
professionals' reluctance to intensively engage in painful conversations with dying people; perhaps because many dying patients
are strongly motivated to disguise their own confusions.
Whatever the reasons, it is clear that state authorities and medical professional groups face a very difficult task and currently
have inadequate experience or research data to design reliable
safeguards to ensure the lucidity of dying patients who might
claim a right to assisted suicide.
2.

Judgment-ImpairingDepression

Distinguishing between a dying person's profound sadness and
an appropriate psychiatric diagnosis of clinical depression is
exceedingly difficult.6 5 For many reasons, however, drawing this
distinction with accuracy and sensitivity is important in designing appropriate treatment for all dying people in order to provide
the greatest possible satisfactions (for conversations, for reconciliations, for good leave-takings) for them and for their families.
Identifying clinical depression is even more important when crucial decisions, such as refusing further medical treatment or
requesting assisted suicide, is at stake. Clinical depression,
which commonly carries deep feelings of personal worthlessness
and hopelessness, distorts an individual's rational capacity to
make choices.
There has been little systematic research regarding the
mental status of dying people who request assisted suicide or
64.

See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).

65. Susan Block & Andrew Billings, PatientRequests for Euthanasiaand Assisted
Suicide in Terminal Illness: The Role of the Psychiatrist,36 PSYCHOSOMATICS 445, 451-52
(1995). The article states:
Depression and organic mental disorders are commonly seen among patients who
request assistance in dying. These disorders can both impair patient autonomy
and coexist with autonomous wishes for hastened death.... Determination of competence in this setting is often extraordinarily challenging, requiring subtle evaluations of thought processes and complex assessments of the patient's cognitive
understanding, affective and emotional appreciation, and character limitations in
understanding the implications of alternative choices.
Id. See also William Breitbart et al, Interest in Physician-Assisted Suicide among Ambulatory HIV-Infected Patients, 153 AM.J.PsYCmATRY 238, 241-2 (1996); Nathan Cherny et
al., The Treatment of Suffering When PatientsRequest Elective Death, 10 J.PALijATIVE
CARE 71, 73 (1994) ("Undertreatment [of depression among terminally ill patients]
derives largely from the problems of recognition and assessment and from the misconception that depression is a normal response to cancer").
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refuse life-prolonging treatment. The limited available investigations suggest two propositions: first, that among terminally ill
patients, "the desire for death could be quite variable over time;"
and second, that clinical differentiation between a "psychologically stable" and a distorted decision is "in practice.., a difficult
distinction to make without actually initiating a course of
treatment."6 6
Safeguards could be designed for the administration of physician-assisted suicide to take account of these considerations. The
Ninth Circuit observed that, consistent with its finding of a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, states may adopt
regulations requiring "reasonable, though short, waiting periods
to prevent rash decisions."67 As the underscored directive makes
clear, however, the Ninth Circuit would exercise independent
judgment about the requisite length of the waiting period, as it
must, if it takes constitutional command of the question.
The problem, however, is that there is not yet enough practical
experience or systematic empirical research to give an adequate
answer to this question. The new Oregon statute requires a
waiting period of "no less than 15 days ... between a patient's
initial request and the writing of a prescription."68 A two-week
waiting period would not, however, be sufficient to account for
the "temporal instability of the desire for death" that has been
69
documented in the existing, limited empirical studies.
The existence of doubts about the appropriate waiting period
between a request for suicide and facilitative action by a physi66.

Harvey Max Chochinov et al, Desirefor Death in the Terminally Ill,
152 Am.J.

PSYCHIATRY 1185, 1189-90 (1995). Chochinov further observes:

It has been reported that depression in the terminally ill can be responsive to both
antidepressant medications and psychotherapeutic interventions, although admittedly there is no well-developed body of controlled research on this issue. Nevertheless, our findings indicate that a substantial proportion of terminally ill
patients who express a desire to die could potentially benefit from a trial of treatment for depression. Although concurrent depression does not necessarily imply
that a desire for death is implicitly "irrational," the reasoning processes of
depressed patients are characteristically biassed by negative mental sets that may
affect their capacity to make well-considered life-and-death decisions. Furthermore, demoralization and lack of assertiveness may render the depressed terminally ill patient more vulnerable to the suggestions of others, thereby increasing
the potential for abuse.
Id. at 1190 (citations omitted).
67. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 833 (emphasis added).
68. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 127.850 § 3.08 (Supp. 1996).
69. Referring to the Dutch experience, currently the only country with any experience of legally recognized physician-assisted suicide, Chochinov et al observe: "Although
the Dutch guidelines are explicit with respect to the requirement that the request for an
assisted death must be persistent over time, it has been reported that in practice, 65% of
all euthanasia deaths occur within [two] weeks of the initial request," a time span which
would be too brief to take account of the "temporal instability of the desire for death that
was observed in our group" of patients. Chochinov, supra note 66, at 1190.
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cian does not mean that the Oregon statute is constitutionally
invalid, though it does point to substantial risks inherent in its
implementation, not only on this matter, but on the entire range
of concerns about ensuring the voluntariness and mental competence of gravely ill people who request assisted suicide. As Justice Brandeis observed in another context:
The objections to the [state law] are obvious and grave. The remedy
might bring evils worse than the present disease. The obstacles to
success seem insuperable. The economic and social sciences are
largely uncharted seas .... Merely to acquire the knowledge essential
as a basis for the exercise of this multitude of judgments would be a
formidable task; and each of the thousands of these judgments would
call for some measure of prophecy. Even more serious are the obstacles to success inherent in the demands which execution of the project
would make upon human intelligence and upon the
character of men.
70
Man is weak and his judgment is at best fallible.
Justice Brandeis made this observation in dissenting from his
colleagues' decision to overturn a state economic regulatory law

during the heyday of the Court's substantive due process interventions. The effect of this constitutional ruling, Brandeis said,
was to "stay experimentation in things social and economic."
This result, he warned, however, "may be fraught with serious
consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco"7 1
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
The voters of Oregon have just recently resolved to embark on
an unprecedented course in legitimizing physician-assisted
suicide. The only guidance available for this action is the experience of the Netherlands, where physician-administered euthanasia, including assisted suicide, has been legally recognized under
judicially-crafted guidelines for twenty years. Until very
recently, however, there have been no systematic studies of the
Dutch experience and it is still difficult to know what lessons,
either encouraging or cautionary, can be gathered from that
experience or, indeed, whether any lessons directly applicable to

the United States can be drawn from this small homogeneous
country with its generously funded, universal health insurance.72
70. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 309 (1932)(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
71. 285 U.S. at 311.
72. See CARLOs Gomz, REGULATING DFATH (1991); Daniel Callahan & Margo
White, The Legalization of Physician.Asisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin
Village, 30 UNIV. RicmoND L. REv. 1, 13-18 (1996); John Griffiths, Recent Developments
in the Netherlands Concerning Euthanasia and Other Medical Behavior that Shortens
Life, 1 MEDcAL LAW INT'L 347 (1995).
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Perhaps other states will follow Oregon's lead. Perhaps Oregon itself will find, after some practical experience with its novel
policy, that, in Brandeis' words, their imagined remedy has
inflicted "evils worse than the present disease." It is unjustified,
even arrogant, however, to imagine that enough is known about
the possible balance of virtues and evils in physician-assisted
suicide for judges to command its legalization in every state at
this moment. This sweeping imposition would effectively end
free experimentation about the feasibility and desirability of this
course, as much as the imperious interventions of the 1930s
Supreme Court blocked social and economic regulatory experimentation in its day. Justice Brandeis was right then and is
right now:
This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike
down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. . . But, in
the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we
erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the
light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.73

III. JUDICIOUS

INITIATION OF A DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

This author's objection to the constitutionalizing of physicianassisted suicide does not rest on the conventionally debated
ground that there either "is" or "is not" a "right to die" already
implanted in the Constitution. This author's conclusion is that it
is premature for any court to reach a final resolution of this issue
because society has virtually no experience on which a judgment
that is both morally and practically informed can be reached.
Justice Brandeis' acknowledgment of the virtues of state experimentation and his conclusion that judges should withhold constitutional judgment to promote such experimentation is precisely
the resolution that this author would adopt in this context.
Although some scholars have expounded on the jurisprudential
implications of Brandeis' position7 4 and some judicial decisions
have drawn on this jurisprudence,7 5 this position does not fit
73. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 309-11.
74. See, most notably, Alexander Bickel's praise for the "passive virtues" in his
well-known but little observed book, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH: THE SUPREME
COuRT AT THE BAR OF POLmCS (1962).
75. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)(refusing either to constitutionally prohibit capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders or to rule out the possibility of such a future constitutional ruling); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560
(198lXwithholding final constitutional judgment regarding televised state criminal trials
notwithstanding the defendant's objections); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)(adopting
constitutional exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence only after extensive prior

state regulatory experience and endorsements).
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comfortably into the more conventional posture of judicial
authoritativeness, of "finality" in rendering judgments based on
high moral abstractions.
Judge Guido Calabresi, one of the members of the Second Circuit panel that invalidated New York's ban on physician-assisted
suicide, directly addressed this jurisprudential issue in a concurring opinion in which he offered an unusual, and unusually interesting, response. Calabresi concluded that the New York state
law was "neither plainly unconstitutional ...nor plainly consti-

tutional"76 in the light of past substantive precedents, but that
the law itself had been "born in a different age,"77 and that the
state "legislature - for many, many years - has not taken any rec-

ognizably affirmative step reaffirming the prohibition" of physician-assisted suicide. 78 Accordingly, Calabresi was prepared to
overturn the existing law in order to assure that the legislature
"really want[s] and [is] prepared to defend laws that are constitutionally suspect."79 Calabresi insisted, however, that this disposition would "leave open the question of whether, if the state of
New York were to enact new laws prohibiting assisted suicide
(laws that either are less absolute in their application or are
80
identical to those before us), such laws would stand or fall."
Calabresi's approach is virtually unprecedented. Though he
invoked a few prior court rulings, these rulings provide only suggestive support for him. The novelty of this approach is not an
indication that it violates the implicit prescriptions of caution
and moral humility that underlie traditional judicial canons in
constitutional as well as common law interpretive practice. To
the contrary, Calabresi's approach is a self-conscious attempt to
devise an explicit adaptation of these virtues to contemporary
judicial practices that pitch constitutional interpretation at such
a high level of moral abstraction and such elevated hierarchic
authority as to offer no alternative between unjustified authoritarianism by courts or by legislative majorities.8 " Calabresi's
search for a technique in judicial interventions is properly guided
by the underlying constitutional imperative to find some mediating ground where legislatively expressed majority will and judi76. Quill, 80 F.3d at 739.
77. Id. at 732.
78. Id. at 735.
79. Id. at 742.
80. Id. at 732.
81. For a general critique that the dominant schools of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence offer only these unacceptable alternatives, see ROBERT A. BuRr,THE
CONsTrrUTIoN IN CoNFLCr 9-33 (1992).
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cially protected minority rights can each claim their just
portions.
The conventional constitutional doctrine of judicial supremacy
has, of course, held that courts are authorized to strike this balance by authoritative proclamation. In actual practice, this conception has most commonly veered between the unjustified polar
extremes of judicial authoritarianism (as epitomized by the judicial deployment of substantive due process to invalidate state
and federal economic and social regulations from the late
nineteenth century almost until World War 11)82 and equally
unjustified, supine judicial deference to majority impositions
(epitomized, and explicitly justified as a reaction to "wrongful
judicial authoritarianism," by the Supreme Court's utter disregard for the rights of a scorned sexual minority in Bowers v.
Hardwick8 3 and its resolute turning away from constitutional
after its premature authoritarian
scrutiny of capital 8punishment
4
strike in Furman).
As much as Calabresi's approach offers a better alternative
than conventional accounts of the process of constitutional interpretation, however, this author believes it is misplaced in its
application to the specific context of adjudicating the constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide laws. This author comes to
this conclusion for two reasons. First, the functional justification
for Calabresi's approach, judicially mandating a "constitutional
remand" to the legislature, gives heightened moral force and
public importance to substantive interests which are unlikely to
be given serious attention in legislative assemblies. This justification does not apply clearly enough to the minority rights at
stake in physician-assisted suicide laws. Dying people are clearly
not a discrete and insular minority in the same, sure way as are
black people subject to race discrimination laws, women subject
to abortion restrictions, convicted criminals condemned to death
or criminally prosecuted homosexuals. This is not to say that
"dying people", as such, have no difficulty in obtaining a legislative hearing. Though we all will die, the prospect is sufficiently
unsettling that most people are constantly tempted to deny their
common bonds with "dying people." This psychological force,
combined with the adamant moral opposition of some politically
powerful social groups, can effectively keep the issues surrounding physician-assisted suicide from serious legislative
deliberation.
82. See id. at 232-67.
83. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
84. See BURT, supra note 81, at 327-44.
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There is a second, and more clearly dispositive, reason for
withholding the kind of intermediating judicial intervention that
Calabresi espoused. This reason is the current, dramatic public
ferment regarding physician-assisted suicide, which in itself
shows that no judicial intervention is now necessary to give visibility and moral salience to the minority claims at stake. If Calabresi were a state court judge with dispositive authority in only a
single state jurisdiction, the absence of sustained legislative
debate within his jurisdiction might be sufficient justification for
a "constitutional remand" that effectively invalidates the antique
but extant assisted suicide prohibition. Judge Calabresi, however, sits as a federal judge with jurisdiction over several states
at once. Moreover, he is charged with interpreting national standards in our single constitutional document, unlike state judges
who draw their authority and substantive principles from specific state sources as well as from the federal Constitution. Legislative actions and popular political movements in other states
are thus relevant for all federal judges, even if those states are
not direct parties to the litigation at hand.
It is accordingly relevant for Judge Calabresi, though sitting
in the Second Circuit, to consider that Oregon voters had authorized physician-assisted suicide in 1992, and that voters in both
Washington and California had specifically rejected such authorizations by popular referenda in the preceding two years.8 5 By
his criteria, these actions would appear to be "current and clearly
expressed statements, by the people or by their elected officials,
of the state interests involved,"8 6 thus mooting his predicate for a
constitutional remand to state legislatures, at least in those
states. The justification for a federal tribunal overturning the
New York state law, not, by Calabresi's hypothesis, because it is
unconstitutional but because the people of New York or their legislative representatives have not recently articulated the state
interests at stake, seems too narrowly constricted in its focus, too
contrived in light of the contemporaneous actions of closely situated sister states.
The fact is that an intense, vibrant national debate about physician-assisted suicide and the social and medical treatment generally of dying people has recently erupted in this country. In
the absence of any such debate, it would be injudicious, in the
sense of being incautious and even morally arrogant, for a federal court to impose on the entire country a constitutionallybased resolution that has been approved in only one state. Cala85.
86.

See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810.
Quill, 80 F.3d at 738.
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bresi's innovative approach is not subject to this critique; indeed,
its mediating character is a self-conscious attempt to adapt traditional virtues of judiciousness to contemporary forms of constitutional adjudication. For Calabresi's more modest approach, the
absence of any debate would be a justification for judicial intervention, but in the specific context of contemporary popular
and legislative consideration of physician-assisted suicide, his
approach is unsuitable. To invalidate the laws in most states,
where physician-assisted suicide barriers have not been "currently" reaffirmed, would give an unjustified advantage to the
proponents of this practice in a currently raging debate in which
neither proponents nor opponents of the practice are clearly dominant in competing for public and legislative attention or
sympathy.
The basic goal of judicial response to the constitutional claims
regarding legalization of physician-assisted suicide should be to
avoid sweepingly dispositive resolutions while the moral and
practical issues involved are freely and widely debated and ultimately brought into clearer focus. Some boldness is needed for
devising an adequate judicial technique to accomplish this goal.
This boldness, though, would be in the service of an appropriate
judicial modesty in approaching "a perplexing question with
unusually strong moral and ethical overtones." 7

87.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).

